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POPE JOHN PAUL II AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN BEING
REV. JOHN J. COUGHLIN, O.F.M.
Since his election in 1978 as the Successor to the Apostle Peter,
His Holiness Pope John Paul II has remained one of the principal
protagonists on the global stage for the dignity and value of every
human being.I Although the popular press and media sometimes have
been slow to recognize this message, an online search of the Holy
Father's copious encyclicals, addresses, and homilies reveals that he
has advocated human dignity literally hundreds of times during the• . 2
course of his twenty-five year pontificate. In fact, long before his
election as Pope, Karol Wojtyla was developing his understanding of
the dignity of the human person in his philosophical and theological•• 3
writings. In a 1968 letter to the French theologian Henri de Lubac,
Wojtyla wrote
The evil of our times consists in the first place in a kind of
degradation, indeed in a pulverization, of the fundamental
uniqueness of each human person. This evil is even much more of
the metaphysical order than of the moral order. To this
disintegration, planned at times by atheistic ideologies, we must
oppose, rather than sterile polemics, a ind of "recapitulation" of
the inviolable mystery of the person....
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. The author wishes to thank Christine
Niles, J.D. '03, for her assistance during the preparation of this essay.
1. See GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS TO HOPE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN PAUL II
289, 348 (1999) (observing that the dignity of the human being has been one of the great
themes of John Paul II's pontificate).
2. Additionally, Pope John Paul II has made over one hundred visits outside the territory
of Italy to virtually every comer of the globe, proclaiming that "man is the primary and
fundamental way for the Church." John Paul II, Address to Celebrate 100 Apostolic
Journeys (June 12, 2000), in L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, June 18, 2003, at 3 (weekly
edition in English).
3. See, e.g., KAROL WOJTYLA, THE ACTING PERSON 72-74 (Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka
ed., Andrzej Potocki trans., D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1979) (1969) (describing the
"ontological foundation" of the concrete and unique experience of each human person as
an acting subject); KAROL WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY 25-34 (H. T. Willetts
trans., Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc. 1981) (1960) (discussing the meaning and
implications of the use of another person).
4. HENRI DE LUBAC, AT THE SERVICE OF THE CHURCH 172 (Anne Elizabeth Englund
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The belief that each human being possesses a metaphysical value
simply in the fact of his or her existence remains at the root of John
Paul II's indefatigable defense of human dignity. In this brief essay,
my purpose is not to afford a comprehensive presentation and critique
of the philosophical and theological foundations of human dignity,
but rather to highlight certain features of John Paul II's thinking that
raise questions about disturbing trends in the law.
1.
The philosophical foundation for John Paul II's defense of the
dignity of the human being begins with two ancient truths. First, it
posits the universality of one human nature that transcends the limits
of history and culture. One must admit that, historically, the idea of
the universality of human nature has stemmed from Aristotelian
cosmology, which mistakenly understood the universe as fixed and
immutable. Because he desires a philosophical approach consistent
with the modem scientific method, John Paul II attempts to retrieve
essential aspects of the tradition through the adoption of a radical
realism and the human capacity to know it. His philosophical method
requires a turn to the human subject and a phenomenological analysis
of the somatic, emotional, intellectual, and moral dimensions of
human experience. 6 Nonetheless, he refuses to embrace a skepticism
trans., 1993); see also KENNETH L. SCHMITZ, AT THE CENTER OF THE HUMAN DRAMA:
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF KAROL WOJTYLA/POPE JOHN PAUL II 39
(1993) ("In all of this, what comes home to Karol Wojtyla is the dignity of the human
person.").
5. See PATRICK A. HEELAN, SPACE-PERCEPTION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
254-58 (1983) (describing the discontinuity between Aristotle's cosmology and the
findings of modem science). For a collection of scientific and theological essays on
cosmology, see generally QUANTUM COSMOLOGY AND THE LAWS OF NATURE,
SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES ON DIVINE ACTION (Robert John Russell et al. eds., 2d ed.
1996).
6. Edmund Husserl was the leading proponent of phenomenology, and there were many
subsequent developments of his thought. See EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF
EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY 258 (David Carr trans.,
Northwestern Univ. Press 1970) (1954) (describing "pure" or "transcendental
phenomenology" as concerned with "self-consciousness," and one's "own exclusive
subject matter"); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 188-95 (John Macquarrie &
Edward Robinson trans., 1962) (discussing intentionality's function in the interpretation of
textual and other symbolic materiality); M. MERLEAU-PONTY, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
PERCEPTION, at viii-ix (Colin Smith trans., 1962) (suggesting that science is a "second
order" hermeneutical expression of the basic experience of the world). Wojtyla's
habilitation thesis at Lublin University focused on Max Scheler's philosophy as a
phenomenological basis for a retrieved Christian ethics. This was an attempt to integrate
the objectivity of Thomism with the emphasis on human experience in modern thought.
Although he ultimately rejects phenomenology as an inadequate explanation of the
objectivity of reality, Wojtyla argued that phenomenology represents a method for probing
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that denies the possibilities for the apprehension of truth in the human
intellect. Rather, John Paul II's reflection on experience leads to his
affirmation of a universal human nature and permanent natural law
contained within the human person.7 In his view, the dignity of the
human person, human rights language, and an objective moral order
all depend on the universality of human nature.
Second, John Paul II accepts the classical metaphysical view,
which understands the human person as characterized by the intellect
and free will.9 In accordance with the modem starting point, John
Paul II believes that reflection on human experience reveals the
human being as a dynamic and irreducible unity of body and spirit.'
°
The intellect signifies the interior consciousness of the human being
in which the multi-faceted interplay of somatic, emotional, reasoned,
aesthetic, and spiritual awareness form the concept of self in relation
to others and to the world. 1" Free will means that the human being
may pursue goals identified in the intellect to constitute oneself
through action.12  The interrelatedness of the intellectual and
intentional faculties enables the human being to constitute oneself in
accordance with the understanding of value recognized through the
intellect and appropriated through the intentional act of the will. In
Pope John Paul II's understanding, each human person remains "a
human experience. He was especially interested in the role played by emotions in support
of moral action. See Robert F. Harvanek, The Philosophical Foundations of the Thought of
John Paul II, in THE THOUGHT OF JOHN PAUL II 1-21 (John M. McDermott ed., 1993)
(describing the Thomist and phenomenological philosophical strains in the thought of John
Paul II).
7. See John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/
encyclicals/documents/hfjp-ii enc 14091998_fides-et-ratioen.html (Sept. 14, 1998)
(describing "attitudes of widespread distrust of the human being's great capacity for
knowledge").
8. See JOHN PAUL II, Veritatis Splendor, in THE ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II 674 (J.
Michael Miller ed., 1996) (discussing the universality of human nature and the moral
order); cf MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 11-41
(1998) (arguing that the justification for human rights language is ultimately religious).
9. See WOJTYLA, THE ACTING PERSON, supra note 3, at 134-35. Compare 1 THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 390-417 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., 1947) (distinguishing between the intellect and will as the powers of cognition and
appetite in the human soul), with RICHARD CROSS, DUNS SCOTUS 83-84 (1999) (believing
that the distinction was not to be real, but only formal, Duns Scotus thus avoids,
apparently, a faculty psychology).
10. See AQUINAS, supra note 9, at 363-70 (discussing the relationship between the
human soul and body); id. at 370-82, 451-58 (discussing the unity of the human being as
body and soul).
11. See WOJTYLA, THE ACTING PERSON, supra note 3, at 36-41 (describing the process
of self consciousness).
12. See id. at 134-35 (describing the act of the will in response to the appeal of value).
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remarkable psychophysical unity, each one a unique person, never
again to be repeated in the entire universe."13 John Paul II thus
understands the dignity of the human being both in an objective and
in a subjective sense. The objectivity derives from the universality of
human nature according to which every human person possesses the
potential for intelligent and free action. The subjectivity flows from
the fact that the human being may employ the intellect and will
creatively to constitute the individual self.
This understanding of human dignity rejects determinism,
empiricism, and idealism. While recognizing the importance of the
human body, John Paul II's philosophical understanding refuses to
limit the person to mere genetic factors as being determinative of who
the person is, and what the person may become. It thus refutes
Freudian theory, in both pristine and derivative forms, to the extent
• . 14
that it exhibits a biological determinism. Likewise, it eschews a
social determinism in which the human person is simply the sum of
environmental factors, which may be predicted and verified by
empirical science. It opposes Marxist theories that attempt to create a
kind of human person through state manipulation of social conditionsIS
and its consequential defacement of the individual person. At the
same time, it also stands as a critique of Cartesian dualism between
mind and body. In contrast to the disembodied Cartesian concept of
the intellect that underlies the work of modem theorists such as Locke
and Hume, John Paul II understands the human being as an embodied
subject. Nor does John Paul II's understanding of human dignity
accept Kantian idealism, which proffers abstract categories, types,
13. Stefan Swiezawski, Introduction to KAROL WOJTYLA, PERSON AND COMMUNITY, at
xiii (Theresa Sandok trans., 1993).
14. See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 8, at 701-02 (rejecting the determinism of certain
theorists who "have come to question or even deny the very reality of human freedom.");
see also PETER GAY, FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME 119 (1998) (discussing the
determinism of Freudian theory).
15. See PERSON AND COMMUNITY, supra note 13, at 220; see also JOHN PAUL II,
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, in THE ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II, supra note 8, at 426, 441-
44 (describing the Marxist and capitalist political realities of the twentieth century and
acknowledging problems with each system).
16. See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 8, at 713-15 (critiquing the separation between the
body and reason as it yields a "purely formal freedom."); see also HEELAN, supra note 5,
at 3-8 (stating a phenomenological critique of Cartesian dualism and rejecting as too
limited the epistemological approach of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, E. Mach, J.S. Mill, and
B. Russell in which to perceive is to be in a pictorial representation that matches physical
reality); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 45-59 (1999) (observing
that the linguistic study demonstrates reason to be dialogical rather than purely literal due
to its dependence on metaphors drawn from the embodied reality of the intellect).
(Vol. 27
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and forms. Along with the erroneous Cartesian dualism, idealist
abstractions fail to account for the basic and concrete experiences of
life. 
v
Reflection on human experience leads John Paul II to affirm reason
as a distinctive human capacity that testifies to human dignity.
Practical reason affords the recognition of a set of fundamental human
goods. 8 Among these basic goods, one might identify, inter alia, life,
knowledge, play, marriage, aesthetic experience, friendship, and
religion.- Through the use of right reason, the human being has the
intellectual capacity to recognize primary and secondary principles as
well as tertiary norms that logically flow from the basic human
goods. Consideration of the basic good of life, for example, points
to principles that prohibit the taking of innocent human life and to
more specific norms such as an international treaty provision against
genocide. This "universal moral law" constitutes a "kind of grammar"
that endows any discussion of human rights or system of law with an
objective "moral logic." 
21
While the universality of human nature and the objective moral
norms derived from it testify to the dignity of the human person, John
Paul II has also drawn attention to the subjective and particular
experience of cultures and individuals. On the one hand, transcendent
human nature renders every human being a "somebody" in a
22
metaphysical sense. On the other, the human being realizes oneself
as "more of a somebody" in an intensely personal and subjective way
through the particular historical circumstances of one's life.23 When
he addressed the United Nations in 1979, John Paul II was
17. Although critical of Kantian idealism, Wojtyla places importance on Kant's second
categorical imperative that one must not use another human person as a means to an end.
See WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 27-28.
18. See AQUINAS, supra note 9, at 451-58 (drawing a specific distinction between the
practical and speculative intellects). "The speculative and practical intellects are not
distinct powers .... For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not
to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which
directs what it apprehends to operation." Id. at 406; see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 100-01 (1982) (describing "practical reasonableness").
19. See FINNIS, supra note 18, at 85-90 (describing an illustrative list of basic goods).
20. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 102-11 (1999).
21. John Paul II, Address to the 50th General Assembly of the United Nations
Organization (Oct. 5, 1995), at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/
john-paul-ii/speeches/1995/October/documents/hf jp-ii-spe 05101995_address-to-
uno en.html.
22. KAROL WOJTYLA, The Personal Structure of Self-Determination, in PERSON AND
COMMUNITY, supra note 13, at 187, 192; see also WOJTYLA, THE ACTING PERSON, supra
note 3, at 72-74 (discussing the ontological basis of action).
23. WOJTYLA, The Personal Structure of Self-Determination, supra note 22, at 192.
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particularly critical of communist and other totalitarian regimes that
stifled individual expression and failed to respect the primacy of the
conscience of nations and persons. The recognition of a transcendent
moral order "safeguard[s] the objective rights of the spirit, of human
conscience and of human creativity ...,24 Upon his return to the
United Nations in 1995, the Pontiff expressed caution about the
emerging globalization, which may signal that "the world has yet to
learn how to live with diversity." In the global environment of the
market economy, the legitimate differences of nations, cultures, and
persons tend to be subsumed into an unrelenting consumerism. With
its materialist reduction of the individual to consumer, this new form
of globalization threatens both the objective moral order and
legitimate diversity of subjective self-expression.
John Paul II's analysis of human experience then recognizes the• . 27
intellect and free will as complementary faculties. As a constituent
aspect of human dignity, the exercise of free will requires that the
person not be restricted by authoritarian regimes and law. This
requirement implies a negative conception of freedom as the absence
of constraint. According to John Paul II, however, a correct analysis
of human freedom entails a balance between negative and positive
conceptions of freedom. Positive freedom focuses upon the basic
human goods identified by the intellect and the power to pursue these
goods in one's life through the exercise of free will.28 In his early
work, Love and Responsibility, Bishop Wojtyla demonstrates the need
for the proper proportions between negative and positive conceptions
of freedom. His analysis of the word "use" points to the conclusion
that in the absence of an objective moral order one human being
would be free to use the other according to subjective preference.
True freedom and true human dignity derive not simply from a
"freedom from" or a "freedom against," but also from a "freedom for"
some substantive value. In the exercise of one's freedom, the human
24. John Paul II, Address to the 34th General Assembly of the United Nations
Organization (Oct. 2, 1979), in U.N. GAOR 34th Sess., 17th plen. mtg. at 353, U.N. Doc.
A/34/PV. 1-32 (1979).
25. John Paul II, supra note 21.
26. See JOHN PAUL II, Centesimus Annus, in THE ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II, supra
note 8, at 588, 631-34 (stressing that ethical and religious values must inform the free
market).
27. See WOJTYLA, The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act, in PERSON
AND COMMUNITY, supra note 13, at 3-21.
28. See WOJTYLA, THE ACTING PERSON, supra note 3, at 174-75 (discussing the
necessary connection between true freedom and moral truth).
29. See WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 25-34.
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being expresses his or her dignity to the extent that one acts in
accordance with the basic goods known in the human intellect.
The limitation of human dignity to a negative conception of
freedom distorts the integrated function of intellect and will. By
overlooking the objective moral order, the limitation suggests that all
truth is ultimately historical and relative. It yields an understanding of
the human being in which the individual creates the self on the basis
of subjective preference. It diminishes rights language to mere human
self-invention. It removes both the metaphysical and moral basis from
the philosophical justification of the concept of the dignity and worth
of every human being.
II.
The theological foundation of John Paul II's defense of human
dignity may be discussed in terms of the biblical themes of creation,
redemption, and consummation.
From the theological perspective, the most fundamental reason for
respecting the dignity of the human being is that each person is
created in the image of God. In a series of talks given during papal
audiences from 1979 to 1980, John Paul II discussed the meaning of
30
the Genesis creation accounts. In the first creation account, Adam's
"original solitude" in the Garden of Eden discloses something
significant about the human condition.31 Adam is alone as there is no
other creature who expresses so fully the imago Dei. Adam is alone
because he is neither fully divine nor merely an animal. He represents
the human being as subject, different from the other animals in the
capacity to think, choose, and act as an agent in the creative process.
The mystery of the human being's creation in the image of God
means that the human person has been endowed with creativity. The
definitive creation of the human being is incomplete until the creation
of Eve. When Adam recognizes Eve as a human being like himself,• . 32
"flesh of my flesh," he is filled with joy. They are embodied spirits
for whom thinking, acting, and expressing depends on the body,
which is not accidental but integral to human nature.3 3 The divine
30. The talks were subsequently published in book form. JOHN PAUL II, ORIGINAL
UNITY OF MAN AND WOMAN: CATECHESIS ON THE BOOK OF GENESIS (1981); see also
WEIGEL, supra note 1, at 336-38 (giving an overall description of the speeches).
31. See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 30, at 21-25.
32. Genesis 2:23; see also JOHN PAUL II, supra note 30, at 43-48.
33. See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 8, at 714-15 ("In fact, body and soul are inseparable:
in the person, in the willing agent and in the deliberate act, they stand or fall together.").
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command to the first parents-to "[b]e fruitful and multiply"-
recognizes that, in the complementarity of the sexes, the capacity for
procreation involves man and woman directly in the divine
34
creativity. The original solitude yields to the creative process of self-
discovery, in which one constitutes oneself through the gift of self to
the other.35
The second creation narrative places the human person at the center
of a moral drama. At the Tree of Knowledge, Adam and Eve possess
human self-awareness as well as an understanding of the choice
between good and evil. 36 As the subjects of the drama, they must
exercise their freedom either to act in accordance with or in rebellion
against the objective truth of the created order of reality. Self-
knowledge and free will open the possibility of the Fall from original
innocence through original sin. The narrative depicts the inner
dialectic of the human person between the ideal person in the supra-
lapsarian state and the actual self of the fractured person who may fail
but nonetheless aspires to act in accordance with the objective truth.
The human person may discover the divine through an act of self-
giving or reject the truth of the Creator's intention through the choice
to be selfish.37 Both of the creation accounts in Genesis thus testify to
the dignity of the human person, created in the image of God, and
thereby endowed with the freedom to exercise creative capacities as
the thinking, choosing, and acting subject in relation to the Creator's
intention implanted in the very nature of the person.
In the first encyclical letter of his pontificate, Redemptor Hominis,
John Paul II elected to focus on the theological principle that the
Redemption of Christ fulfills and enhances the dignity of the human
being. John Paul II starts his reflection on the Mystery of
Redemption with a statement about the Incarnation. "Through the
Incarnation," the Pontiff observes, "God gave human life the
Patrick Heelan writes:
[T]he individual human subject ... [is] identical at all times with a Body that he
or she uses or experiences; that Body is inserted into its experienced setting, a
World (for that subject), within which it is both a noetic subject, and an object
through which physical causality flows freely without interference or pause.
HEELAN, supra note 5, at 12-13.
34. Genesis 1:38; see also JOHN PAUL II, supra note 30, at 99-120; JOHN PAUL I, supra
note 8, at 709-10.
35. See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 30, at 128-34; WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 3, at 126.
36. See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 30, at 27-42.
37. See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 30, at 35-42, 121-40.
38. See WEIGEL, supra note 1, at 288.
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dimension that he intended man to have from his first
beginning . . . ."9 It was a patristic theme of Iranaeus, which
culminated in the Christology of the Franciscan school with Duns
Scotus, that even in the absence of the Fall, the Creator had intended
the Incarnation as the fulfillment of the creative process. In other
words, God so loved the human being that, in the Incarnation, human
flesh was divinized. The act of the Incarnation, in which the eternal
Word of God took on human flesh, reveals the "greatness, dignity and
41
value" of the human being.
Given the reality of the fallen human condition as a consequence of
original sin, the incarnational theme needs to be complemented by theS42
Augustinian realism adopted in the Thomistic synthesis. For Pope
John Paul II, the Redemption of fallen creation and the disorder of the
human situation reveal the profound depth of God's love. Even after
humanity's rejection of the order of divine love, God remains faithful
to his creative intent. The events of the Paschal Mystery of Christ
reveal that unconditional love is the only antidote to sin and death.
The Mystery of the Redemption is the proof of the perfect love of
God expressed in the forgiveness of all humanity. John Paul II
writes that the human person cannot live without this love. In the
absence of the "revelation" of love, the human person remains
"incomprehensible" to self. If the human person "does not encounter
love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not
participate intimately in it," the person remains incomplete, isolated,44
and alienated from the divine mystery. God's forgiveness of
humanity, which is expressed in the Son's perfect self-sacrificial love,
serves as a testament to the highest degree of human dignity both by
revealing the love of God for humanity and by demonstrating the
fullest possibility for the human person.
39. JOHN PAUL II, Redemptor Hominis, in THE ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II, supra
note 8, at 46, 47.
40. See JOHN BEHR, ASCETICISM AND ANTHROPOLOGY IN IRENAEUS AND CLEMENT
57-65 (2000); RICHARD CROSS, THE METAPHYSICS OF THE INCARNATION: THOMAS
AQUINAS TO DUNS SCOTUS 311 n.2 (2002).
41. JOHN PAUL II, supra note 39, at 59.
42. See HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, A THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 206-07
(Benziger Verlag trans., 1967) (describing Augustine's doctrine of the fallen nature of the
human being and its further clarification in the thought of Thomas Aquinas to mean that
the post-lapsarian human being enjoys the imperfect use of reason and will which are in
need of redemption).
43. See JOHN PAUL II, Evangelium Vitae, in THE ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II, supra
note 8, at 792, 815 ("Christ's blood reveals to man... his greatness..
44. JOHN PAUL II, supra note 39, at 58.
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Pope John Paul II's prophetic voice in defense of the dignity of
every human being is grounded not only in the theology of creation
and redemption but also in the consummation of time, which is both
already and yet to come. The Pontiff s deep understanding of the
Catholic tradition includes a love for Mary, Virgin and Mother, as the
45
exemplar of the eschatological hope for humanity. She is the new
Eve, who like humanity's first parents in their supra-lapsarian state, is
innocent of original sin. Unlike the fallen primogenitors, she chooses
good over evil. The Lucan infancy narratives identify her as a human
creature without sin, who in her simplicity, humility, and joy renders
the fiat that opens the doors of Redemption. John's Gospel records
that she stands steadfast, courageous, and faithful at the foot of the
Cross.47 In the ancient tradition established on the basis of the Acts of
the Apostles, she is present in the cenacle when the Holy Spirit
descends on the Church to fill it with wisdom.48 Together with her
Son, Mary thus already represents the full possibilities for human
dignity in the here and now. Theologically, the rest of humanity can
only anticipate the fullness of human dignity, which it is believed will
come to eschatological fruition at the consummation of time.
III.
What connections might one draw between the philosophical and
theological foundations of John Paul II's conception of human dignity
and law? Again, my purpose here is not to present an exhaustive
response to this question, but only to mention a few issues and
examples.
To start, every system of law reflects certain assumptions about
what it means to be human. 49 The law interacts with these






49. See John Paul II, Pope's Address to the Roman Rota (Feb. 5, 1987), in
L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Feb. 23, 1987, at 6 (weekly edition in English) (stating that
canon law must flow from the essential elements of theological anthropology); John Paul
II, Address to the Roman Rota (Jan. 26, 1988), in L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Feb. 15,
1988 at 7 (weekly edition in English) (urging that canon law should reflect an "integrated
concept of the person" in accord with theological anthropology, which strives to enhance
both natural and transcendent values.); see also John J. Coughlin, Law and Theology:
Reflections on What it Means to be Human from a Franciscan Perspective, 74 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 609, 610-11 (2000) (noting the different elements of liberal theory).
[Vol. 27
No. 1] Pope John Paul II and the Dignity of the Human Being 75
anthropological assumptions, with the result that, over the course of
time, the law influences society's understanding of what a human
being is and ought to be. The law of the former communist states that
comprised the Soviet Union, for example, defaced the dignity of the
individual and exaggerated the role of the state. As a philosopher and
bishop in Communist Poland, Karol Wojtyla developed a theory of
the human being that stressed solidarity and participation in
subsidiary structures such as the family, church and labor unions in
order to offset the alienation yielded by the communist system of
law.' ° When he began to shape his anthropology through lectures,
writing, and pastoral activity starting in the 1950s, it would have been
virtually impossible to predict that his ideas would ultimately
contribute to the fall of the communist system in Poland and
throughout Eastern Europe. Although there is debate about the exact
extent of John Paul II's influence in bringing about the collapse, few
reliable scholars would contend that he was not a factor in the
disintegration of the repressive regimes that comprised the Soviet
Union. I The concept of the dignity of every human being stood in
sharp contrast to the defaced anthropological assumptions of the
communist system. What started as the ideas of a young scholar priest
eventually developed into the profound insights about human dignity
of the philosopher Pope.
Although he is a proponent of democracy, John Paul II's concern
for the dignity of the human being presents challenges to the legal
systems of the modern liberal states. First, John Paul II's
anthropology suggests that human dignity requires legal recognition
of the fundamental spiritual nature of the human being. Religion for
John Paul II is not only a basic human good but representative of the
highest realm of the human person's creative energies. As a bishop at
Vatican II, he contributed to the formation of the council document
that bears the title Dignitatis Humanae (On Human Dignity).52 The
document articulates the essentially spiritual nature of the human
being and the corresponding importance of religious freedom as a
50. See WOJTYLA, THE ACTING PERSON, supra note 3, at 276-79; KAROL WOJTYLA,
Participation or Alienation?, in PERSON AND COMMUNITY, supra note 13, at 197-206.
51. See JONATHAN KWITNY, MAN OF THE CENTURY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF POPE
JOHN PAUL II 590-92 (1997) (discussing the various theories about the role played by John
Paul II in the collapse of Soviet communism).
52. VATICAN COUNCIL (2D: 1962-1965), Declaration of Religious Freedom (Dignitatis
Humanae), reprinted in The Sixteen Documents of Vatican II (Marianne Lorraine Trouv6
ed., N.C.W.C. trans., Pauline Books & Media 1999) (1965), available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist-councils/iivaticancouncil/index.htm.
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basic human right. While the implications of this anthropological
principle for the anti-religious and totalitarian governments of the
former Soviet Union were evident, John Paul II is troubled about the
viability of the anthropological principle in an increasingly
secularized Western world. From his perspective, the protection of the
spiritual nature of the human being remains absolutely essential to
democratic government and human fulfillment. One aspect of this
protection requires formal recognition of the individual's legal right
to practice one's religion free from state coercion. In the first
encyclical of his papacy, the Holy Father stated: "[T]he curtailment of
the religious freedom of individuals and communities is not only a
painful experience but above all an attack on man's very
dignity. . . . 53 An equally important aspect of the protection of
religious liberty necessitates that the state recognize the autonomy of
the church. A more recent papal statement, for example, has
expressed concern about the nascent Constitution of the EuropeanS54
Union. In dislocation from their historical tradition, many of the
European governments presently doubt the advisability of explicitly
recognizing in the Union's Constitution the role of religious culture
spirituality, and life in the formation of Western civilization.
5 5
Clearly, John Paul II does not share the worry that an expressed
recognition of the obvious would jeopardize human freedom, but he
believes that the dislocation illustrates a significant threat to human
dignity in an increasingly secularized world. John Paul II's words
challenge the European Union and all of Western civilization not to
forsake the cultural heritage that gave rise to the philosophical and
theological foundations of the concept of human dignity.
Second, John Paul II's focus on the dignity of the human being
confronts the anthropological assumptions espoused by the market
53. JOHN PAUL II, supra note 39, at 77.
54. John Paul II, Address of John Paul II to the Presidents of the Parliaments of the
European Union (Sept. 23, 2000) ("[T]he Union must not forget that Europe is the cradle
of the notions of the person and of freedom, and that these notions emerged because the
seed of Christianity was planted deep in Europe's soul."), at
http://vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/speeches/2000/jul-sep/documents/hf-jp-
ii_spe._20000923_european-unionen.html.
55. See Pope Urges Europe to Avow Christianity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2003, at A3
(decrying the fact that the European Union plans to omit any mention of God or its
Christian heritage in its Constitution).
56. See CHARLES TAYLOR, A CATHOLIC MODERNITY? 25-37 (James L. Heft ed., 1999)
(suggesting that the secular critique of Christianity has resulted in a humanism which has
ironically advanced basic Christian values, but that this humanism is now itself threatened
as a result of the loss of the transcendent).
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economy. The market economy tends to generate an image of the
human person whose primary fulfillment is as a consumer of an ever
greater array of material goods so as to gratify apparently limitless
subjective desires. This image runs contrary to the location of human
dignity in the individual's capacity for thinking and acting in
accordance with an objective moral order. While he has endorsed "the
positive role of business, the market, private property and the
resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free
human creativity in the economic sector," John Paul II stresses that a
component aspect of the objective moral order remains the just
57
distribution of goods among the members of society. Moreover, the
image of the human being as a consumer also underestimates the
legitimate role played by human participation and solidarity in family
life, religious association, and other fundamental forms of human
fulfillment. In Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II warns of the dangers
posed to human dignity by a system of law that encourages cultural,
economic, and political currents, which diminish participation and
solidarity. He writes: "A person who, because of illness, handicap or,
more simply, just by existing, compromises the well-being or life-
style of those who are more favored tends to be looked upon as the
enemy to be resisted or eliminated. 5 8 For John Paul II, the
metaphysical dignity of the human person stems not from what an
individual produces or consumes but from one's ontological worth as
a being in the image of God.
Third, John Paul II proposes that the moral measure of the dignity
of individuals and communities is at the same time located precisely
in how they relate to the less fortunate members of society. During his
1994 pastoral visit to the United States, he spoke specifically to
Americans urging us "to defend the right to life of every human being
from conception to natural death, to care for and protect the unborn
and all those whom others might deem 'inconvenient' or
'undesirable."'" The Pope recalled that society has an obligation to
defend the basic goods and rights of the powerless. This moral
principle "is not something alien to America, but rather speaks to the,60
very origins of this nation!" The Pontiff's challenge raises questions
about the proper development of rights language in constitutional law.
57. JOHN PAUL II, supra note 26, at 632.
58. JOHN PAUL I, supra note 43, at 802.
59. WEIGEL, supra note 1, at 779.
60. Id.
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Rights language has tended to focus on individuals and their
subjective preferences. 6 1 The dominance of individual autonomy
suggests a separation of law from the value afforded by the objective
moral order. Additionally, rights language has tended to reflect a
negative concept of freedom, which in itself is insufficient to inform
the human being and society about the good. Unless the negative
notion of freedom is balanced with a positive account, it is difficult to
establish the correct proportions between subjective desires and the
common good. These tendencies in the development of rights
language could obscure the metaphysical worth of each human being,
which is measured by the degree of protection afforded to the
powerless.
Finally, John Paul II's conception of human dignity calls not for a
culture of blame but for a culture of forgiveness. The Pontiff s
reservations about the death penalty are now well known.63 Over and
over again, he has appealed to the heads of nations and states to grant
clemency and spare the lives of various individuals who have64
received judicial sentences to die at the hands of the state. It is not
that the Pontiff wishes to deny the heinous nature of the crimes
committed by some persons on death row or the need for retributive
justice. Rather, as a disciple of Christ, he firmly believes that
forgiveness, not blame, remains one of the most sublime
manifestations of human dignity. He knows the great spiritual truth
that when we forgive someone for a serious injury, we transform
ourselves. A culture of blame defiles not only the natural and
supernatural dignity of the human being who needs forgiveness but
also of the one who has the capacity to forgive the other.
61. See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 43, 808-10.
62. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT
18-31 (1997) (discussing "republican liberty," which means "freedom as non-
domination"); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 28-30 (1995) (comparing liberal theory's "negative liberty" of
freedom from government interference and "positive liberty" of the individual's right of
political participation and suggesting the borders between negative and positive
conceptions of liberty are often unclear); see also Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein,
Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1202-03 (1982) (stating the
role of the judiciary and individual rights, in which, consistent with traditional liberal
theory, the courts function to curtail government intrusions into the realm of individual
autonomy through a set of fundamental constitutional rights).
63. See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 43, 844-45.
64. See Hubert B. Herring, Pope's Plea for Clemency Spares Life of Inmate, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, §4, at 2 (reporting that in response to John Paul II's plea for
clemency, Missouri Governor Mel Carnahan had commuted the death sentence of Darrell
J. Mease, who was to have been executed on February 10, 1999).
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The Pope's desire for a culture of forgiveness and redemption goes
far beyond the specific issue of the morality of the death penalty. His
desire directly confronts the notion of a secular salvation. He has
experienced personally the futility of the salvation offered by Marxist
65
regimes. While appreciating the great scientific, economic, and
social advances of the modem democracies and the market economy,
John Paul II rejects the notion that material well-being constitutes
ultimate salvation. He knows that neither communism nor capitalism
can redeem human history from the evil perpetrated by human beings
and societies. For the Pontiff, salvation and redemption remain
inherently religious ideas. As a disciple of Christ, John Paul II
believes that absolute salvation and final redemption may only be
discovered in the self-sacrificial love and forgiveness of the Cross.
The Cross stands as the greatest testament to human dignity.
CONCLUSION
The philosophical foundation of Pope John Paul II's defense of
human dignity has metaphysical, existential, and moral dimensions.
The universality of a transcendent human nature affords a
metaphysical foundation for the dignity and worth of each human
being. Existentially, the human being acts through the intellect and
will to create a sense of self in concrete historical circumstances. The
creative freedom of the human being is enhanced to the extent that the
will acts in accord with the objective moral order understood in the
intellect. Theologically, John Paul II sees the human being as created
in the image of God, conflicted as a consequence of freedom to
choose between good and evil, redeemed by the perfect love of
Christ, and living in the present time with the hope of the absolute
consummation of this love. Considered together, the philosophical
and theological foundations constitute a sturdy conceptual structure
on which to rest human dignity. It is upon this structure that the
Universal Pastor of the Catholic Church has relentlessly preached his
message of human dignity to the four comers of the earth.
65. See JOHN PAUL II, CROSSING THE THRESHOLD OF HOPE 132 (Jenny McPhee &
Martha McPhee trans., 1994) (cautioning against oversimplification in identifying the
causes of the Soviet system's collapse and stating his opinion that Soviet Communism fell
of its own "mistakes and abuses").
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